

NAME P/N QTY	CRIT	FAILURE MODE & CAUSES	FAILURE EFFECT	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE

SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY, ITEM 115 (PIVOTED, PLANAR) ----- SV778540-56 (1)	3/1RB	Contamination breakthrough, DCM end fitting filter or PLSS end filter.	END ITEM: Contamination passes through filter into downstream line.	A. Design - Downstream of these 25 micron filters are two 25 micron filters that would prevent contamination from reaching the 113B orifice. The fluid flowing through the screen is clean, dry oxygen at subsonic velocity.
OR (ORU) ----- SV824133-8 (1)		Erosion.	GFE INTERFACE: Release of contamination downstream during recharge. Filters downstream would pick up contamination prior to entering 113A.	B. Test - PDA Test - Release of contamination into the 113B orifice would prevent the orifice from meeting a 5.5-6.78 lb/hr O2 requirement at an inlet pressure of 850-950 psia. Certification Test - Certified for a useful life of 20 years from the date of manufacture. Successful refurbishment will extend useful life to 30 years max. (Ref. EMUM1-0491, EMUM1-0027). C. Inspection - Details are 100% inspected per drawing dimensions and surface finish characteristics. Details are manufactured from material with certified physical and chemical properties. All details, gases and test facilities are cleaned and inspected to H53150 EM50A to preclude contamination clogging.
			MISSION: None for single or double filter failure (breakthrough). Terminate EVA if contamination reaches and clogs the 113B orifice.	D. Failure History - None. E. Ground Turnaround - None. Testing would be invasive due to filter location.
			CREW/VEHICLE: None for single, double, or triple failure. Possible loss of crewman with loss of SOP.	F. Operational Use - Crew Response - Pre/PostEVA and EVA: No response, single failure not detectable by crew or ground. Training - No training specifically covers this failure mode. Operational Considerations - Not applicable.
			TIME TO EFFECT /ACTIONS: Seconds	
			TIME	

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115FM19


AVAILABLE:
Minutes.


TIME REQUIRED:
Immediate.

REDUNDANCY
SCREENS:
A-PASS
B-FAIL
C-PASS

EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT
SYSTEMS SAFETY REVIEW PANEL REVIEW
FOR THE
I-115 SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
CRITICAL ITEM LIST (CIL)
EMU CONTRACT NO. NAS 9-97150


Prepared by: 
HS - Project Engineering


Approved by: 
NASA - SSA/SSM
LSS



HS - Reliability



NASA - EM/SSM


HS - Engineering Manager


NASA - S & MA


NASA - MOD


NASA - Crew


NASA - Program Manager